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Abstract	
 The purpose of the thesis is to determine the impact that foreign direct investment has 
had on New Hampshire. New Hampshire as a state was impacted far less severely than much of 
the rest of the country, which could be considered surprising given the relatively high cost of 
housing in the state. I believe that part of what made New Hampshire more recession resistant is 
having the right foreign companies providing employment. To do this, I will be looking at FDI as 
a percentage of GDP over the previous 40 years and looking for a correlation between a higher 
percentage and national recession. I will also look at specific foreign corporations that lend the 
most to the New Hampshire economy to obtain a more specific view of the impact such 
companies have on both their communities and the state as a whole. This data could prove useful 
to New Hampshire as well as other states looking to protect against recession, as well as 
corporations looking to justify FDI to various governments.  
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Introduction	
 Foreign Direct Investment, henceforth referred to as FDI, plays a small but significant 
role in the economy of NH, and may explain NH’s lower average unemployment rate when 
compared to the rest of the country. Whether or not FDI has saved NH from the worst of the 
Great Recession, it deserves a closer look than researchers have given it in the past. I felt that 
FDI had to do more than simply provide an alternative for employment and contribute to 
infrastructure in developing nations. I felt that it instead acts as an economic stabilizer and 
strengthener in any area in which it exists. 
 We will be taking a look at the effects which FDI has on the NH economy in both 
monetary format and from the point of view of employment. Subsequently to this we will focus 
on FDI employment in Massachusetts, Maine, and the United States as a whole, and how they 
compare to NH. Finally we will take a close, brief look at the top five foreign companies within 
the state of NH in order to get a better idea as to the kind of companies who choose to set up in 
NH. 
Methodology	
 I broke down the research into four categories to facilitate data collection and analysis. 
Initially I had hoped to collect mostly financial data but due to legal constraints on the 
availability of aspects such as corporate compensation of employees I was forced to use 
employee counts and the federal average per employee salary for foreign owned companies. The 
phases are as follows: 
Phase	1	
 I began by compiling data from the New Hampshire Department of Resources and 
Economic Development (DRED), the NH Department of Employment Security (NHES), as well 
as the US Bureaus of Economic Analysis and Labor Statistics (BEA and BLS respectively). The 
BEA provided the bulk of my data, giving the number of employed both as a whole and 
specifically to Foreign owned entities, the NH State GDP and gross FDI wages for the one year it 
was recorded. The BLS provided the unemployment rate. NHES provided median income for 
NH. I then analyzed the data, looking at FDI as a percentage of GDP for the state of New 
Hampshire, as well as employees of foreign owned companies as a percentage of the total 
number of people employed within New Hampshire, then delved deeper to look at unusual 
patterns, particularly those clustered around recessions and booms. This preliminary analysis was 
key to determining the direction of the paper, as it provided insight into the general impact of 
FDI on the state. 
Phase	2	
The next step was to look at the companies with the largest FDI in New Hampshire and 
examine the direct impact upon the communities they inhabit. For this I required data from the 
SEC’s EDGAR database, the corporations themselves, or from the cities and the state. The 
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purpose here was to get a more detailed picture of the individual companies’ impact upon the 
state on both a macro and microeconomic scale. This is particularly important as it can identify 
correlations and causality in particular economic effects, which could then be used to both re-
analyze the previous data and allow me to identify important differences between the FDI in 
New Hampshire and other states. The list of the largest foreign companies in the state was 
provided by the New Hampshire Business Review’s yearly “Book of Lists.” 
Phase	3	
Next, I collected the same data from phase one in reference to the other New England 
states, using sources relevant to each individual state’s economic policies. This portion of the 
project was less in depth than in phase one due to time limitations, focusing only on employment 
numbers, which proved to be more available. I again analyzed the data regarding FDIs impact 
upon the GDP of each state, and attempted to identify patterns in how the percentage changes 
during periods of recession  or boom in order to compare it to the data from phase one. I also 
used patterns found in phases one and two to find any discrepancies in correlation and causation 
regarding data between states in hopes of finding important differences in FDI function in each 
state. 
Phase	4	
Finally, I collated all relevant data and expanded upon any interesting findings in an 
attempt to understand important differences between New Hampshire’s FDI and that of the states 
in the rest of the region. I also developed possible explanations for any unique occurrences and 
discrepancies within my findings.  
Estimations	and	Other	Important	Data	Problems	
 The largest issue that arose with data collection led to the largest assumption in all of my 
research. This issue was with data relating to gross wages paid in the state of New Hampshire by 
all foreign owned entities. Due to a series of legal, regulatory, and budgetary reasons this data is 
only collected once every five years and was only released to the public once, in 2002. Thus I 
was forced to use gross wages paid by foreign owned entities in the entire US. Once divided by 
the number of people employed by foreign owned entities, I was able to arrive at a mean per 
capita income for those employed by foreign companies. While NH mean income is slightly 
below the average for the entire US initially and then rises above the national average, I felt that 
this data was close enough to be relevant to my research, although I would like the opportunity to 
recalculate using more accurate figures in the future. In addition to this, foreign wage data stops 
after 2006 when the BEA changed their reporting style regarding FDI. Non-Wage benefits stop 
after this point, as part of the calculation requires wage data. As such, I added compensation for 
both the State of NH in general and foreign entities in specific, with per capita compensation 
being calculated using the same method as per capita wage. Compensation is defined by the BEA 
as:  
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“The income received from an employer as remuneration for work. It includes cash payments, payments-
in-kind, and employer expenditures for employee benefit plans including those mandated by government 
statute, such as employer contributions for government social insurance (BEA interactive data).” 
 Of a less important note, New Hampshire’s FDI employment numbers for 2005 and 2006 
are redacted and listed as a value $25,000-$49,999. As such, I estimated them by taking values 
that were 1/3 and 2/3 the distance between 2004 and 2007. This resulted in a steady decline 
which is unlikely to be true, as both years are pre-recession. The data for 2005 and 2006 in 
Maine and Massachusetts may also be erroneous, but for different reasons. During these two 
years the BEA was altering how they counted jobs created by foreign owned companies and both 
states see an unusual dip in FDI employment numbers in both absolute terms and relative to total 
state employment. The year 2012 for all three states is also an estimate as the BEA has yet to 
release the relevant data on that year. For simplicity, I decided to make 2012=2011. While this 
data is undoubtedly incorrect, it is close enough to show the continued importance of FDI and 
was not used to calculate any other figures. 
 Different data sets start in different years as government agencies failed to collect the 
relevant data prior to the first year listed. As such 1977 is the earliest year that all collected data 
is available. Due to this gap, some calculated data is irrelevant before 1978, particularly data that 
compares to prior years. Such data is usually represented by zeroes or an error message in the 
spreadsheet. In addition, all years prior to 1997 I was required to use the BEA archive for 
Employment and compensation data. The specific data sheets I used were G1 for federal data and 
G7 for state data. These forms are F1 and F7 respectively prior to 1992. In addition I had to use 
archival data for US FDI wages for all years as this data was not available on the BEA 
interactive data. The wage data also stops after 2006, leaving this portion incomplete and thus 
requiring estimates for the remaining years. 
Calculations	
The following formulas were used to calculate various columns of data: 
 
GDP	Data	
Yearly growth in GDP= GDP for NH(Current year- prior year/Prior year) 
Gross NH wages (in millions)= Per Capita Income * Number of Employed (NH)/ 1,000,000 
Yearly Growth in Gross Wages=Gross NH Wages (Current year- prior year/Prior year) 
Growth in NH Per Capita Income= NH Per Capita Income (Current year- prior year/Prior 
year) 
FDI Per Capita Income=FDI Gross Income/Total US FDI Employees*1,000 
Growth in FDI Per Capita Income=FDI Per Capita Income (Current year- prior year/Prior 
year) 
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Gross NH FDI Wages (in Millions)=FDI Per Capita Income*Number of Employed by Foreign 
(NH)/1,000,000 
Growth in NH FDI Wages= Gross NH FDI Wages (Current year- prior year/Prior year) 
Foreign Wages as a % of Gross Wages= Gross NH FDI Wages/Gross NH Wages 
FDI Wage Multiplier=FDI Per Capita Income/NH Per Capita Income 
Net Change Row=Column data range limits (last-First) usually row 35-row 6. GDP is row 41-
row 2 
Average row= Column Data Range limits (average of range) usually rows7 through 35. GDP 
Growth is average of rows 3 through 41 
Non‐Income	Monetary	Data	
Per Capita NH Compensation= Gross NH Compensation/Number of Employed * 1,000,000 
Growth in Per Capita NH Compensation=Per Capita NH Compensation (Current year- prior 
year/Prior year) 
FDI Per Capita Compensation= FDI Gross Compensation/Total US FDI Employees 
Yearly Growth in FDI Per Capita Compensation= FDI Per Capita Compensation (Current 
year- prior year/Prior year) 
Gross NH FDI Compensation (in Millions)= Number of Employed by foreign (NH)*FDI Per 
Capita compensation/1,000,000 
Growth in NH FDI Compensation=Gross NH FDI Compensation (Current year- prior 
year/Prior year) 
Foreign Compensation as a % of Gross NH Compensation=Gross NH FDI 
Compensation/Gross NH Compensation 
FDI Compensation Multiplier= Per Capita FDI Compensation/ Per Capita NH compensation 
Per Capita Non-Wage Benefits=Year n (Per Capita NH Compensation-Per Capita Income) 
Growth In Per Capita Non-Wage Benefits=Per Capita Non-Wage Benefits (Current year- 
prior year/Prior year) 
Per Capita Foreign Non-Wage Benefits=Year n (Per Capita FDI Compensation- Per Capita 
FDI Income) 
Growth in Per Capita Foreign Non-Wage Benefits= Per Capita Foreign Non-Wage Benefits 
(Current year- prior year/Prior year) 
Benefits Multiplier=Per Capita Foreign Non-Wage Benefits/Per Capita Non-Wage Benefits 
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Net Change Row=Column data range limits (last-First) usually row 35-row 6. Compensation 
Columns are row 40-row 7. 
Average row= Column Data Range limits (average of range) usually rows7 through 35. 
Compensation Columns are rows 7 through 40. Growth in compensation columns, formulas are 
(net change in relevant compensation/beginning compensation+1)to the power of 1/number of 
periods of data) 
Employment	Numbers	(Relevant	Region)	
% Change in Employment from Previous Year= # of Employed (Year n -Year (n-1))/year (n-
1) 
 Foreign % of Total Employed= # Employed by Foreign/ # of Employed 
% Change in Foreign Employment from Previous Year= # Employed by Foreign (year n – 
year (n-1))/year (n-1) 
% Change in Foreign Employment from Previous Year, With Smoothing= % Change in 
Foreign Employment from Previous Year (year (n-1) + year n+ year (n+1))/3 
Foreign Employment %= Foreign % or total Employed * Employment % 
% Change in Foreign Employment % from Previous Year= Foreign Employment % (year n 
– year (n-1))/year (n-1) 
% of Job Growth Attributable to FDI= # Employed by Foreign (year n-year (n-1))/ absolute 
value of # of Employed (year n-year (n-1)) 
Net Change Row= Column data range limits (row 40-row 6) 
Average= Column data range limits (average: row 7 through 40)  
Average % change in employment and FDI employment=(net change in relevant 
employment/beginning employment+1)to the power of 1/number of periods of data) 
Average percentage of job growth attributable to FDI= net change #employed by FDI/# of 
employed 
Standard deviation row= standard deviation on column data range limits (usually row 6 
through row 40 except those containing cells with no data) 
US	Compensation	
Per Capita US Compensation=gross US compensation (in millions)/Total US 
Employment*1000000 
Per Capita Compensation % Yearly Change= per capita compensation (year n-year (n-1)/year 
(n-1) 
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FDI Per Capita Compensation % Yearly Change= FDI per capita compensation (year n-year 
(n-1)/year (n-1) 
Net Change Row= Column data range limits (row 40-row 6) 
Average Row= (net change in relevant compensation/beginning compensation+1) to the power 
of 1/number of periods of data)  
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Results	
This section will discuss collected and analyzed data free of opinion or conjecture, divided into 
three parts: 1) generalized economic data relating to NH; 2) More specific data relating to the top 
companies within the state; 3) general economic data for MA, ME, and the US in general. 
General	Economic	Data	for	New	Hampshire	
Data	Relating	to	GDP	
 GDP for the State of NH grew from 1973 to 2012 by $60,524 million from a start of 
$4173 million, averaging an annualized average 7.6% growth. Between 1977 and 2006, NH 
gross wages increased by $26,812.28 million from $2716.29 million, with an annualized average 
growth rate of 8.7%. During this same period, NH FDI gross wages increased by $1970.53 
million from $108.71 million, and its annualized average growth rate was 11.1%. NH per capita 
income grew by $34,797 during this period from a start of $6,866 and had an annualized average 
growth rate of 6.5%. During this period the NH FDI per capita income increased by $37,465.38 
from a start of $13,001.44, with an average annualized growth rate of 4.8%. Between 1977 and 
2006, FDI income accounted for an average of 6.09% of gross NH wages. 
 Between 1977 and 2011, Gross NH Compensation grew by $33,190.90 million from an 
initial value of $3841.30 million, growing at an average annualized rate of 7%. During the same 
period, Gross NH FDI Compensation grew by $2920.76 million from an initial value of $128.85 
million, growing at an average annualized rate of 10.5%. During this same period, NH per capita 
compensation grew by $43,391.95 from an initial value of $9709.72, growing at an average 
annualized rate of 4.88%. During the same period, per capita FDI compensation increased by 
$61,212.76 from an initial value of $15,410.54, growing at an average annualized rate of 4.6%. 
Between 1977 and 2006 NH per capita non-wage benefits grew by $2,979.55 from an initial 
value of $2,843.72, growing at an annualized rate of 3%. During the same period, NH FDI per 
capita non-wage benefits increased by $15,342.27 from an initial value of $2,409.10, growing at 
an average annualized rate of 7.4%. 
Data	Relating	to	Employment	
 Between 1977 and 2011, total employment in the state grew by 301,769 people, up from 
a starting number of 395,614. Average yearly growth in employment was 1.60%. During that 
same period, employment by foreign based companies grew by 31,439 people from a base level 
of 8361 people. Average yearly growth for foreign employment was 4.34%. On average, foreign 
employment made up a total of 4.71% of total NH employment during this period, although it 
accounted for 10.4% of total NH job growth during the period. On the federal unemployment 
rolls, those employed by foreign owned companies made up an average of 4.71% of all 
employable people in the state of NH during the period. 
Data	Relating	to	Employment	for	Massachusetts	
Between 1977 and 2011, total employment in the state grew by 1,220,401 people, up 
from a starting number of 2,833,405. Average yearly growth in employment was 1.02%. During 
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that same period, employment by foreign based companies grew by 167,609 people from a base 
level of 30,326 people. Average yearly growth for foreign employment was 5.64%. On average, 
foreign employment made up a total of 3.59% of total MA employment during this period, 
although it accounted for 13.7% of total MA job growth during the period. On the federal 
unemployment rolls, those employed by foreign owned companies made up an average of 3.39% 
of all employable people in the state of MA during the period. 
Data	Relating	to	Employment	for	Maine	
Between 1977 and 2011, total employment in the state grew by 281,523 people, up from 
a starting number of 512,788. Average yearly growth in employment was 1.26%. During that 
same period, employment by foreign based companies grew by 25,887 people from a base level 
of 5,713 people. Average yearly growth for foreign employment was 4.48%. On average, foreign 
employment made up a total of 3.63% of total ME employment during this period, although it 
accounted for 9.2% of total ME job growth during the period. On the federal unemployment 
rolls, those employed by foreign owned companies made up an average of 3.42% of all 
employable people in the state of ME during the period. 
Data	Relating	to	Employment	for	the	US	in	General	
Between 1977 and 2011, total employment in the country grew by 71,299,500 people, up 
from a starting number of 105,042,200. Average yearly growth in employment was 1.48%. 
During that same period, employment by foreign based companies grew by 4,930,789 people 
from a base level of 1,218,711 people. Average yearly growth for foreign employment was 
4.49%. On average, foreign employment made up a total of 3.03% of total US employment 
during this period, although it accounted for 6.9% of total US job growth during the period. On 
the federal unemployment rolls, those employed by foreign owned companies made up an 
average of 2.84% of all employable people in the country during the period. 
Data	relating	to	Compensation	in	the	US	in	General	
US per capita compensation in general grew at an average rate of 4.14% while FDI 
compensation grew at a rate of 4.60%. Per capita compensation increased by $35,816.93 from a 
start of $11,128.86 between 1977 and 2011, while per capita FDI income increased by 
$61,212.76 from 15,410.54 during the same period. Total US compensation grew by $7109.5 
billion and total FDI compensation grew by $452.4 billion. 
Information	Regarding	the	Five	Largest	Foreign	Companies	in	NH	
 The five foreign companies which employ the most people in NH are the Delhaize Group 
(Hannaford Brothers) with 4,817, BAE Systems with 4,500, Freudenberg & Co. 
Kommanditgesellschaft (Freudenberg-NOK) with 1,151, Osram GmbH (Osram Sylvania) with 
1,135, and Minebea Co., Ltd. (New Hampshire Ball Bearings Inc.) with 1,028 (NHBR 101). 
Apart from the Delhaize Group which is a grocery retailer, all of the companies listed are 
manufacturers, and also manufacture goods meant to be sold both within the United States and 
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abroad. These five employers accounted 12,631 jobs in 2012, which means that if 2012 had a 
similar number of FDI jobs, they were responsible for more than 30% of them.  
Discussion	
 Even before we get in depth, we can see some interesting trends. First is that foreign 
companies provide pay and benefits greater than that which is provided by companies 
domestically. This can be seen not only with a look at the compensation multipliers, but also by 
taking a look at the percentage of NH pay and benefits come from foreign companies compared 
to the percentage of people in NH who are employed by foreign companies. The second 
observation is that in every area observed, there was significant growth in foreign employment 
up until the early to mid-2000’s. We also see that the foreign employment played a larger role in 
NH than it did in MA, ME, or in the US in general. 
GDP	and	Compensation	analysis	
 Since a perfect comparison between GDP and Foreign investment in the state was not 
possible, I will instead look at gross income and gross FDI income to determine the effect that 
FDI has on GDP. The ratio between the two should be roughly equivalent to the ratio of FDI 
contribution to state GDP and the state GDP itself. That is (Gross FDI Income: Gross Income ~ 
FDI Contribution to GDP: GDP). From this estimate we can determine that FDI contributed 
roughly 7.04% of the $56,103 million dollars in the 2006 NH GDP ($3,949.65 million), which is 
the last year we have FDI income data for. If instead we use compensation as our ratio (Gross 
FDI Compensation: Gross Compensation ~ FDI Contribution to GDP: GDP) by assuming that 
the amount of benefits that get paid out within the state by all companies is roughly proportionate 
then we arrive at a 2006 figure of 8.35% ($4684.6 million) and a 2011 figure of 8.24% of a GDP 
of $63,333 million ($5,218.64 million). Using the full column for compensation ratio we see that 
between 1977 and 2000 there was a build-up in the percentage of GDP that was FDI, going from 
a low of 3.35% in 1977 to a high of 9.2% in 20001. Since then the percentage has varied up and 
down, though between 2003 and 2011 it varied in a range of only .56% peak to trough. 2002 did 
suffer an unusually low portion of GDP at 6.34% but given that this is the year after the 9/11 
attacks, we suspect that this is due to a national hyper-patriotism, and not unique to NH. This 
hypothesis is supported by US employment data which saw a 5.48% drop in FDI employment 
nationwide in 2002, the single largest national drop in the dataset including the height of the 
great recession. Alternatively, this drop could be a combination of market correction for post-
recession and an unusual growth in 2000. 
 Continuing to look at the compensation ratio we see that in every year of a recession, 
barring 2001 and 2007, FDI compensation went up relative to total compensation, which 
suggests that FDI is at least somewhat more inflation tolerant than the business community in 
general. We support this by pointing out that after each recession there is a downward correction 
                                                 
1 An anomalous year. See page 13 for possible explanation. 
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in the compensation ratio, with the exception of the 1980-1982 recession, in which the correction 
happened in the second year after the recession was over. Together this suggests that FDI 
demand for workers is somewhat more inelastic than that of the economy as a whole. This would 
explain why it increases its compensation percentage during a recession but then reduces it once 
the recession is over. This data is reinforced when you look at employment numbers, although 
FDI employment is more likely to go down during a recession than the compensation is. 
 There were several years in which gross FDI compensation increased at a significantly 
higher rate than gross NH compensation. Among these, the year 1981 stands out for several 
reasons. The growth for FDI was nearly 3 times higher than for NH in general. Only a small 
portion was from benefits. Finally, unlike in 2000, where the increase was partly the result of a 
significant jump in the number of FDI jobs within the state, the majority of the growth came 
from an increase in per capita FDI compensation. This indicates a shift toward higher paying 
foreign jobs, and also marks the beginning of what will become an enormous growth in the 
benefits multiplier. 
 Switching focus to the FDI wage multiplier, we see that at all points, FDI jobs pay more 
on average than domestic jobs. This has been trending downward since it started however. The 
most logical reason for this is that foreign companies set up facilities in the United States in 
order to have access to the highly skilled workers that reside here, rather than the unskilled 
laborers, whose domestic jobs persist longer. As the less skilled labor drops out of the labor force 
or retrains, the wage disparity has decreased, although it has held roughly steady at slightly over 
1.2 times median income since the new millennium began. Since this has some similarity to the 
growth of FDI in the country, it is possible there is some correlation which reduces the wage 
disparity as FDI becomes more prevalent within the region. Obviously there must be some 
relationship as the larger a percentage that FDI holds in the GDP, the closer the mean income for 
the state will be to the mean income of FDI employees. Running a correlation calculation we 
find that they do in fact have a rough correlation of -0.7685. Since it is unlikely that the foreign 
wage multiplier will ever be less than 1, it is unlikely that this correlation would remain constant 
should FDI begin growing as a percentage of GDP again. 
 If we change focus to FDI non-wage benefits multiplier we see something more 
interesting, which we did not anticipate. The non-wage benefits multiplier has been growing 
non-stop since 1977, if a bit unevenly. While benefits make up a smaller portion of total 
employee compensation than wages, foreign employers inflate the mean benefits package to the 
point where it is over a quarter of total FDI Compensation, as opposed to less than one eighth of 
the state mean compensation. The fact that the FDI non-wage multiplier is 3.04 suggests that 
foreign companies often try to lure more skilled workers by offering better benefits than their 
domestic competition. Some other possible explanations include a higher percentage of lower 
paying jobs that have dropped their benefits significantly, thus dragging down the mean benefits 
for all domestic jobs in NH. Alternatively, there could be state and federal laws which require 
foreign companies to pay out more than their domestic counterparts would. This last explanation 
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is the least likely however as this treatment would likely lead to a complaint to the World Trade 
Organization and I could not find any such case on record. 
 Some data is slightly misleading out of context. For example, in both the case of wages 
and compensation, the average yearly percentage of per capita growth is higher for NH in 
general than it is for FDI specifically. Taken out of context, this could be used to argue that FDI 
growth is less significant. However, if you look at nominal values, which are relevant on a per 
capita basis, then we discover that FDI outperformed the per capita mean in both wages and 
compensation for total growth over the span of the data. This puts better perspective on the 
utility of FDI than looking at Gross values, as gross compensation vs gross FDI compensation 
are apart by more than an order of magnitude. Focusing on per capita growth we can see that 
employees are better compensated for their labor by foreign owned entities, and while domestic 
compensation is growing faster than FDI, it will be a long time before they are equal, assuming 
they can maintain their growth rate, which is unlikely. If we look at the linear regression table for 
compensation, we see that domestic compensation is actually losing growth more quickly than 
FDI compensation. This suggests that the FDI compensation multiplier should begin working its 
way up again should this trend continue. This is a reasonable explanation for why the multiplier 
has held roughly flat for the past ten years. One note is that a significant portion of this shift is 
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 FDI played a significant role to the growth of the NH economy during the 80’s and 90’s, 
but growth in FDI came to a standstill in the 2000’s, during which period the GDP of NH slowed 
its growth significantly. While it cannot be claimed with certainty that the former caused the 
latter, they are definitely related, and since FDI as a percentage of GDP has held relatively 
constant since 2003, this suggests that it has been growing evenly with the NH GDP, suggesting 
a lack of additional investment on the part of foreign employers. This means that for one reason 
or another, foreign companies no longer see additional benefit in investing within NH. Such lack 
of additional investment does not benefit the people of NH, as foreign jobs excellent benefits 
alongside a higher average wage, something that benefits both NH citizens and the state as a 
whole. 
NH	Employment	Analysis	
 FDI only plays a small role in the New Hampshire economy. In 2011 it only made up 
5.71% of the total New Hampshire workforce. At the same time it has provided an outsized 
source of growth for New Hampshire. It also helps to stabilize our workforce in uncertain 
economic times. Below we shall discuss FDI employment in more detail. 
 FDI employment grew through 2000, after which there was a small drop in numbers and 
it has subsequently fluctuated up and down slightly. Total jobs in NH, in comparison, increased 
up until the great recession, which suggests that foreign companies stopped investing more into 
NH well before domestic companies did. In addition, domestic companies came back after the 
recession ended, though FDI employment dropped, which fits the pattern mentioned earlier that 
foreign jobs remain more constant during recessions but suffer a drop once the recession is over. 
This lack of investment should be a concern, especially if it persists, as the last few years in the 
table actually show a downward trend, which would negatively impact the GDP if it were to 
continue. This is because even if domestic jobs were to increase, they do not have a 1 to 1 impact 
on the GDP relative to FDI jobs. Based solely off wage, we would need to gain 1.2 domestic jobs 
for every foreign job lost just to stay even in GDP. It would thus be more efficient to encourage 
FDI development within the state as a way to encourage GDP, than to encourage domestic 
growth. 
 One of the most important points is exactly how much faster foreign employment grew 
compared to employment as a whole. While total employment in NH grew an average of 1.60% 
a year, FDI employment grew by 4.34%. The problem with this figure is the fact that the vast 
majority of FDI employee growth took place prior to 2001, and the past 10 years have seen a 
large percentage of FDI contraction in employment figures took place in the past 10 years. This 
would be less of a concern if total employment had seen a similar drop. This was not the case 
however, leaving us concerned that FDI has less reason to expand within the state relative to 
total corporate investment. 
 If we take a look at how this growth was early on, we can see that foreign employment 
doubled in less than 10 years from 8,361 at the start of the data set, then doubled again within the 
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next twelve years. However since that time there has barely been more than a 4000 employee 
total increase in FDI employment, a growth in pure numbers that prior to 2000, FDI saw occur 
six times. The high point for FDI employment numbers, not counting 2000, was in 2004 when 
there were 42,600 people employed by foreign owned companies within NH. If we were to stop 
tracking data at that point then FDI would have been responsible for 11.7% of total job growth in 
NH since 1977. After 2004, total NH employment only grew by 9,528 up to 2011 while FDI lost 
2,800 jobs in that time, meaning that FDI lost more than a quarter of the net employment gain in 
that seven year period. Also, since as we’ve already determined FDI jobs are worth more than 
jobs in general, we can determine that there are roughly 0.2*2800= 560 jobs worth of wages lost 
which are unaccounted for in the data as it is spread between all people who ended up employed 
at a  lower salary than would otherwise have been available to them. 
 In an attempt to compensate for the anomalous jump in hiring that occurred in 2000, I 
created a column that used data smoothing to create a clearer picture of the long term growth in 
FDI employment. Taking a look at this column we see that FDI growth was significant in the 
80’s, and while it slowed down in the 90’s it still outpaced growth in general. However as we 
have seen reflected in the other employment numbers, this trend changes after the year 2000. In 
this column, it shows no positive growth after 2007 and only three years of positive growth after 
2001, each of which is less than 1/2 of one percent.  
 During the 80’s, FDI employment growth was truly prodigious, with six years of double 
digit growth, and only two years of negative growth. In comparison the highest growth rate for 
jobs in NH in general was 6.61% which was 2% higher than any other year in the 80’s, although 
general employment saw no negative growth during this period. Average yearly growth for FDI 
employment during this decade was 8.93%, significantly higher than the 2.97% growth which 
NH jobs in general saw. From this data, it becomes clear that there was a massive push toward 
foreign companies moving into NH.  
 Addressing the year 2000, whose performance I could not find an explanation for, 
although we could assume that the BEA may have changed their reporting criteria starting at this 
point, which created the jump in data, although this does not explain the subsequent significant, 
though less severe drop in 2001. Also, none of the other regions in which I collected data had as 
significant a jump in employment, although both Massachusetts and the US in general showed 
slightly higher than normal growth in this year. Another possible explanation would be that a 
new company opened up facilities in NH in 2000. Going further with this, the data would suggest 
that setup created an enormous amount of short term employment, while only boosting 
permanent employment somewhat. This explanation is more likely, although only two foreign 
companies operating in NH could provide employment opportunities of that size, The Delhaize 
Group which owns Hannaford’s Grocery stores, and BAE Systems. Since both Massachusetts 
and Maine also have Hannaford’s Stores but saw no similar large spike in FDI employment, we 
can eliminate this as an option even though the purchase took place in 2000. This leaves BAE 
Systems, which was founded in the US in November of 1999. Since BAE would have achieved 
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some of this growth by purchasing US companies and keeping their current employees rather 
than hiring new ones, this would mean that NH employment in general would not have increased 
as significantly as FDI employment. This is confirmed in the data, as total NH job growth was 
actually 1,125 fewer new employees than FDI employment growth saw. If this hypothesis holds 
true, then the 2001 drop in FDI employment is most likely to be from BAE systems letting 
employees go as they correct for positions in which they have redundancy, since BAE created 
their US subsidiary by purchasing multiple US companies, all within the same industry. 
Unfortunately, I was unable to confirm this theory as BAE provided documents to the SEC 
EDGAR database starting in 2003 and their own website lists financials starting in 2004. In 
addition, even if I had access to these filings, it is unlikely that they would list their hiring and 
firing on a state by state basis. Despite my inability to find confirming data, I will use the 
creation of BEA Systems Inc. as my working hypothesis to explain the anomalous numbers from 
2000. 
 Shifting focus to the data itself, we can see that FDI employment grew by 10600 jobs in 
2000, an increase over 1999 by almost 1/3. On a similar note, gross FDI wages in the state also 
grew by 36.5% in 2000. At the same time per capita FDI income grew by slightly less than the 
year prior or the year following, going up slightly more than $2000 on average, while per capita 
income in NH in general went up slightly more than $3000 dollars on average. In 2001 we see a 
drop of 4000 FDI employees despite the fact that employment in general increased slightly. The 
only bright spot for FDI in 2001 is that per capita FDI income grew by 7.3%, or just over $3000. 
2000 was also the high water mark for FDI in the state as a percentage of both total employed 
and the total workforce within NH, at 6.88% and 6.70% respectively. The next highest year is 
2001, in which it made up 6.24% and 6.03%. Since then FDI has slipped further as FDI 
employment continued to contract while NH employment in general grew. However it has not 
slipped as low as the pre-2000 level of 5.39%. 
 Turning our attention to the final column of the NH Employment spreadsheet we find 
what percentage of the job growth for that year was from FDI. In any year where the percentage 
is greater than 100%, whether positive or negative, means that total FDI growth was greater than 
growth in NH employment in general. A positive number means that FDI grew positively for that 
year, regardless of whether or not employment in general grew positively. In cases where general 
employment shrank, the FDI percentage shows how much worse the employment loss would 
have been, had it not been for growth in FDI. A negative percentage always means that FDI 
shrank. 
 The first years we will focus on are 2000 and 2008. In these years growth in general was 
positive, but FDI growth made up more than 100% of growth, which means that had FDI growth 
not occurred, the state would have lost employment for that year. While this statement is 
obviously murky regarding 2000 since FDI growth was most likely caused by the purchase of 
US companies rather than actual hiring, the fact that in 2008, FDI employment made up 354.6% 
of total employment growth for the state is far more interesting. Looked at another way, had it 
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not been for FDI within the state, instead of gaining 423 people in 2008, New Hampshire would 
have lost 1077 jobs. While not an enormous loss compared to the more than 8000 jobs lost in NH 
in 2009, it still would have hurt the economy, and put NH on roughly on par with the percentage 
of job loss that the US in general saw in 2008. 
 At the other end of this spectrum we have the year 2002, in which all job loss was 
essentially from FDI, with 101.4% of the net loss in jobs occurring in foreign owned companies. 
This is not to say that NH would have been fine that year without FDI. Job growth net of FDI 
was a grand total of 12 jobs, something which could easily be a reporting error as FDI jobs are 
reported in the hundreds. This job loss was also fairly normal nationally as the US in general saw 
a 0.22% drop in employment, slightly higher than that which was seen in NH.  
 Next we look at 1990, 1991, and 2003, in which NH in general saw a drop in 
employment which was mitigated by a gain in FDI employment. In particular, 2003 would have 
seen twice the rate of decline in employment had it not been for FDI, though again the job rate 
change was a miniscule 398 employees. Together with what we already know about 2002 
suggests a very slow recovery from the 2001 recession, and in fact growth in the NH economy 
and employment slowed to a crawl after this point, with employment growth never rising above 
1.72% statewide. This rate is rather sluggish compared to the rest of the US in general, although 
this is from a combination of lower unemployment on average, as well as lower population 
growth. 
 Focusing next on the year 2001, we see that FDI took an enormous hit, which left NH 
with less than ¼ the employment growth it would have had otherwise. While there were other 
years in which FDI cut into the growth of the state employment, 4 out of 6 occurred within the 
last 10 years of the dataset. Also, no other year created quite as much drag on growth apart from 
2002, which we discussed earlier. These two years taken together bring up an interesting point. If 
we are correct in assuming that the 2000 jump in FDI employment was from BAE systems 
purchasing NH companies and a significant portion of the subsequent loss of jobs was from BAE 
removing surplus employees, then there is some hazard to FDI development which occurs when 
foreign companies purchase multiple domestic ones, rather than building their own subsidiary 
from the ground up.  
 From this spreadsheet, we can see that FDI has done a lot to help grow jobs in NH. 
However, the FDI growth has stopped within the last decade, and even some of the growth 
before that was not without its costs. Still, it is clear that NH workers did benefit from the period 
of growth which occurred in the 80’s and 90’s, as it resulted in FDI supplying more than 10% of 
new jobs. When paired with the higher pay and greater benefits, NH would do well to encourage 
new foreign companies to come here. 
Massachusetts	Employment	Analysis	
 The first comparison will be with MA. While it is a similar size to NH and contains a 
similar mix of natural resources, it has a significantly larger, more diverse population as well as a 
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much larger economy. MA presents an interesting dichotomy in comparison to NH. While on 
one hand, FDI makes up a smaller portion of the MA employment market, on the other hand, it is 
responsible for a larger percentage of total job growth since 1977. This is because MA FDI 
started out with barely more than half the proportion of the total state job market than NH FDI 
had, 1.07% compared to 2.11%. At the same time, the MA FDI average yearly growth rate was 
1.20% higher. Still, it is obvious that MA does not rely as heavily on FDI as does NH. 
 While FDI did make up a larger percentage of MA job growth than NH job growth, part 
of the issue stems from the fact that MA saw a smaller total percentage job growth than did NH. 
MA total employment only grew by 43% between 1977 and 2011 while NH grew by 76% during 
this period. In comparison, MA FDI employment grew by 553% and NH FDI employment grew 
by 376%. When looked at this way, there is an enormous difference in total relative growth for 
FDI employment, but NH was already more reliant on FDI at the start, making the growth in MA 
outsized by comparison. However this does mean that should this trend continue, MA will 
eventually have a larger percentage of its job market derived from foreign employer than NH. 
 In terms of growth, MA saw a pattern similar to NH, in that most of the buildup in FDI 
employment occurred in the 80’s and 90’s with a peak in 2000, followed by a slump. There is a 
difference however, in that MA saw a more severe slump through the early 2000’s but began 
seeing growth again in 2006, and has only had one negative year since, in 2009. NH on the other 
hand, saw some growth in 2003 and 2004, but has only had one year of FDI growth since then, in 
2008. Also, while MA saw fewer years of double digit FDI growth in the 80’s, it saw higher 
double digits, as well as no years of negative growth. In comparison, employment in general for 
MA saw one year of negative growth and no years in which growth was above 6%. Finally, 
unlike in NH, MA FDI employment does not always suffer a post-recession dip.  
 MA saw some unusual growth in 2000, although it was not anywhere near the growth 
which was seen in NH. In total, FDI employment only increased by 16.55%. Over the length of 
the data set, MA saw 5 years with higher growth rates than that, although most were in the 80’s. 
On the other hand, 2000 still saw the largest growth for FDI in sheer number of people 
employed, increasing by 32200 people. On the other hand, over the next 3 years MA lost all of 
the gain in FDI that occurred in 2000 and at the end of the data set was still barely above the 
1999 level. Since this is completely different from what we saw happen in NH after 2000, we 
can assume that whatever caused the FDI employment growth in MA for that year was strictly 
temporary. 
 As previously mentioned, we see FDI employment growth far outpacing growth in 
general for the state, up until 2001 where it begins to move more closely in sync with the number 
of total jobs in MA, although general employment did better in the middle of the decade, while 
FDI employment outperformed during the Great Recession. Also, since gross employment 
growth in general is a positive sum since 2001, for all important purposes it has outperformed 
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FDI employment in terms of job creation within the last decade, mostly due to the significant 
losses suffered by FDI between 2001 and 2005. 
 Looking at absolute figures we can see that FDI employment in MA doubled between 
1977 and 1982. It then doubled again by 1989. While it came close to doubling again in 2000, it 
currently rests at a 50% increase from where it stood in 1989. This is similar to what we saw in 
NH although it is a somewhat more accelerated rate as we expect given the higher average 
growth rate. This also includes the post-2000 slow down which suggests that this is a trend not 
limited to NH. While part of it can be explained by the unusual bump that both states saw in 
2000, there is a greater trend involved. 
 Moving now to the final column on the spreadsheet, we will first note that in only one 
year is the percentage greater than 100%. This year is 1982, and just as in NH in 2008 this data 
shows that FDI is the only reason that MA had growth in employment for that year. Were FDI 
not to have grown at all, MA would instead have lost over 3500 jobs. While not an enormous 
loss, this was during a recession and anything that spares the economy further pain can be 
viewed as a good thing. This is what both years have in common. They both spared their states’ 
economies from further hardship.  
 In both 1989 and 2010 FDI saw an expansion in employment which greatly compensated 
for the loss which happened in employment in general for the state of MA during those years. 
Neither year was a significant loss for employment in general, but 1989 showed a large gain for 
FDI employment. In fact, had not been for the FDI gains that year, the loss of employment would 
have been greater than 1%. In real terms, MA would’ve lost 47,000 employees rather than the 
28,000 that they actually lost. 
 Next we will look at 1992, 2001, 2004 and 2005. These are the years in which FDI 
showed significant contraction in opposition to a growth in general employment for the state. 
The worst of these losses occurred in 2005 when 15,700 people were removed from the FDI 
employment rolls despite a net gain in general employment of 40,000 people. The three post-
2000 years are not a surprise given that we had already discussed the significant contraction in 
FDI employment that took place during this period. 1992 on the other hand, is most likely 
explained by looking at the trend of contraction that occurs in FDI after a recession ends, 
although this trend was more common in NH that it is MA. 
 MA showed us what a larger more prosperous state looks like in terms of FDI mixture. 
As we found, while their growth in FDI employment was higher their reliance upon it was lower 
than we see in NH. Still, FDI played role in the growth in employment since 1977 and thus also 
an important role in the growth of GDP within MA since that time. Care should be taken to 
continue the trend of FDI growth within the state. 
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ME	Employment	Analysis	
 Next we’ll switch our focus to ME, a state of similar population size and economic 
prosperity to NH, but with a significantly larger landmass. ME is another state in which the FDI 
employment growth rate is greater than New Hampshire’s because it is starting from a lower 
percentage. Unlike MA however, ME saw a smaller percentage of its total employment growth 
since 1977 come from FDI when compared to NH, only 9.2%. ME also relies on FDI less than 
the other two states, with only 3.98% of their employment made by FDI employees as of 2011. 
Interestingly, ME is also the only region we looked at in which there is no unusual employment 
boost in 2000. On the other hand, ME does have a rather large bump in FDI right at the 
beginning of the Great Recession which none of the other regions have.  
 Looking initially, we can see that employment growth in ME was slower than in NH but 
also somewhat faster than MA, growing 55% between 1977 in 2011 as opposed to 76% and 43% 
respectively. Maine’s yearly growth in FDI employment is also somewhere between NH and 
MA, growing a yearly 4.48% to their 4.34% and 5.64%. Given these two facts it may seem 
surprising that FDI makes up such a small percentage of Maine’s workforce and workforce 
growth. However, this is once again a case of where FDI was to start and when the largest 
percentage of growth took place. In this case, ME started out with fewer FDI jobs than NH, 
combined with a higher starting total Number of jobs. This allowed ME to grow at a significantly 
faster pace than NH, while still ending up with a total number of FDI jobs created which was less 
than what we saw in NH, 25,887 as opposed to 31,439. 
 The initial growth rate for FDI jobs in ME was actually remarkably high, and between 
1981 and 1986 ME actually had a larger percentage of its employment coming from FDI than 
NH did. After this period however, ME failed to keep pace with the growth seen in both NH and 
MA, mostly due to a poor and occasionally negative growth in the 90’s. It is uncertain why 
exactly ME suffered such significant change in fortunes, since the other regions all saw growth 
in the mid 80’s, while ME experienced a peak in 1984 that it would not reach again until 1995. 
After that point, ME saw reasonable growth up to 2001, though as mentioned before it did not 
see the boost in employment that the other two states did. ME FDI employment then shrank 
again until 2005, in which it lost nearly 20% of its FDI employment. Since then however, ME 
has seen growth each year apart from 2009, the last year of the Great Recession. 2007 actually 
saw a significant jump in FDI employment for ME, one which was not followed by significant 
decline in FDI employment, which was the pattern for the year 2000 bumps that NH and MA 
saw. 
 Switching focus to the final column once again, we note that there are three values 
greater than 200%, two positive and one negative. We also see five years in which the value is 
not only negative, but greater than 50%. NH only has two such years, and MA has none. Neither 
have a negative year greater than NH’s 101.4%. On the other hand there are also five years in 
which FDI was responsible for a positive 50% of the total growth in jobs for that year. In this 
area NH has three years and MA has four. However, both have years where the percentage of 
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employment attributable to FDI was around 350%. What this tells us, is that in ME FDI is more 
likely to have a significant impact on yearly job growth than would be expected in the other two 
states, while also being more evenly distributed, as NH and MA both seem to have longer tails 
toward the positive end. 
 Looking first at 1981, we see that FDI made up 255.5% of job growth this year. However 
in this year growth was negative. This means that had it not been for the FDI, job losses during 
that year would have been more than 3 times worse than they were, with a loss of more than 
4000 jobs rather than just over 1200, during a recession year. This year occurred just at the tail 
end of the FDI boom in ME. Subsequently, growth was more moderate mixed with some periods 
of mild negative growth. 
 Switching next to 1995 we see a year with positive growth and FDI made up a total of 
247% of that growth. As we have seen before, this means that were it not for FDI, growth for this 
year would have instead been negative. Rather than a gain of 1800 jobs, there would have been a 
loss of 2700. That means, between these two years alone, FDI saved or created around 5500 jobs. 
While we obviously cannot guarantee that these people would not have found other employment, 
it still represents a large enough quantity of people to shift the unemployment rate by more than 
half a percentage point. 
 If we look at 2005 though, we see a single year FDI job loss of 6100 people. FDI made 
up negative 231.9% of all job gains for that year. Rather than the 2600 new employees that ME 
saw for that year, there would have been 8700, and unemployment would have dropped rather 
than risen in that year. While this brings the net job gain for the three years in which FDI had the 
largest effect on the number of employed to -600 people, These are only the extremes, and due to 
the nature of the data, tend to be years in which employment in general did not change 
significantly, so that the smaller changes in FDI are magnified. 
 ME started off with an enormous boom in FDI employment, but something changed in 
1985. Since then it has failed to keep pace with either NH, which surpassed it in 1987, or MA, 
which surpassed it for the last time in 1998. Since then FDI has dropped below 4% of total 
employment and has yet to recover. There was even a period during the 2000’s in which ME FDI 
employment percentage was below the national average. While FDI employment is trending 
upward again, it is growing at the sluggish pace that MA currently has. Unfortunately, finding 




 This segment will focus on total US FDI employment as it compares to NH employment 
only, rather than talking about US numbers in isolation or as it relates to all three states. The US 
is only included to get an average reading that better highlights the importance of FDI in NH. 
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The US is far to varied in law, regulation, population mixture, or natural resources to ever 
provide clear explanations on what could affect the economy enough to move employment in 
one direction or another. This does give it an advantage as a measuring tape however, especially 
since the economy is too large for any single corporate acquisition to shift the employment 
numbers. 
 Foreign employment nationwide started at a smaller percentage of total employment than 
NH did, beginning at a mere 1.16% of total US jobs. With a high point of 3.95% in 2000, it 
should be said that FDI has never made up a particularly large portion of US jobs. As of 2011 
FDI stood at 3.49% of total US employment, meaning that NH at that point had 2.21% more of 
its jobs come from foreign entities. With a high point of 6.88% in 2000, NH had almost a 3% 
greater percentage of its jobs from FDI. In fact, at no point in the entire data set does the US in 
general have a greater percentage of its jobs come from FDI than NH does. Other than this 
difference in scale, FDI in the US follows a remarkably similar trajectory to NH FDI. There is an 
initial boom in the late 70’s and early 80’s, followed by a slowdown in growth in the mid-80’s. 
There is a shorter boom from 1987 to 1989, followed by a more turbulent 90’s which includes 
some negative growth. Both reach their peak in FDI employment percentage in 2000, followed 
by subsequent losses and turbulent growth. Interestingly, this is not quite the pattern followed by 
the GDP, so it is clear that expansion in FDI does not correlate perfectly to economic growth. 
 From 1977 to 2011 FDI made up a total of 6.9% of US growth in employment, a full 
third lower than the percentage of growth which NH ad come from FDI. Total employment grew 
by 68%, compared to NH’s 76%, so in this instance NH actually saw more total employment 
growth than the US in general. In the US, FDI grew by 405% compared to NH’s slightly lower 
376%. When these two statistics are combined it is easy to see why the US had a larger average 
FDI as a percentage of total jobs growth rate than NH. It was a combination of lower general job 
growth, mixed with the fact that FDI jobs in the US were starting as a smaller ratio. 
 On average, US unemployment numbers were 2% higher than NH. FDI made up 1.68% 
less of the total people employed worked for foreign companies in the US than in NH 
specifically. Finally 1.62% more of the total work force of NH worked in FDI jobs than the US. 
While I cannot guarantee that FDI would really make up a significant portion of the employment 
rate gap between NH and the US, it at least provides an interesting thought, although it seems as 
though a similar pattern occurs with both MA and ME who have average employment rates 
1.16% and 1.41% lower than NH while having 1.11% and 1.08% less of their total workforces in 
FDI, respectively. 
 During recessions FDI in the US followed a similar pattern to the US in regards to its 
proportion within total employment, increasing and reducing its share, with the exception of 2 
years in which US FDI employment grew while NH FDI employment shrank. This brings up 
another important difference. We can easily see that FDI growth in the US was negative only one 
year before 2001. In comparison, there were four years in which NH FDI employment growth 
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was negative. This suggests that US FDI employment is somewhat more stable than in NH, a 
suggestion which is backed up by their standard deviations of 7.37% and 8.09%. 
 Referring back to the percentage growth in FDI employment for the 80’s, it is important 
to point out just how similar their growth rates are, particularly in 1980, 1981 and 1987 through 
1989. The reason for this is that their similarity tells us that whatever was causing the enormous 
growth in FDI employment was a result of national or international effects, and not as a result of 
policy from a specific state. On the other hand, in 1993, 1998, and 2000 NH saw growth which 
was either non-existent on the US chart, or was growth to a smaller degree. This suggests that 
there were events within the state which contributed to FDI growth, such as state policy or, if our 
hypothesis regarding 2000 is correct, a corporate decision.  
 Regarding the final column for US employment, we find that there are far fewer times in 
which FDI made up a significant portion of US job growth. Only three times was the percentage 
greater than 50 and two of those three times the growth was negative. Unsurprisingly, all three of 
these years saw very little change in total employment in one direction or the other, each with 
less than 0.25% growth in total employment. Interestingly, NH FDI had movements in the same 
direction that met the 50% cutoff in those same years. Those years are 2001, 2002, and 2008. 
The only difference is that in 2008 US employment in general was negative, while in NH it was 
positive. Since we already stated earlier that the only reason employment growth was positive in 
2008 for NH was because of FDI, we can safely assume that either FDI saw less growth in the 
US in general, or that since FDI makes up a smaller portion of the US job market, it would have 
to work harder to compensate for a similar size loss. As NH had an FDI employment growth rate 
of 3.70% compared the US rate of 3.88% we can assume that the smaller amount of FDI was 
simply unable to grow enough to make up for the hit to US employment. 
 2001 and 2002 tell a different story as both are negative, while at the same time both US 
and NH employment grew in 2001 but shrank in 2002. The only real difference is the proportion 
of negative growth which each contributed to their relative job markets. NH FDI affected its 
economy more strongly during the negative growth in 2002, while the US FDI had a greater 
impact in 2001 while US employment was still expanding. These events highlight the similarity 
between the US FDI growth and that of NH. 
 It is clear that while NH followed a similar path to the US in general regarding FDI 
employment, overall it outperformed the country in nearly every aspect measured, apart from 
average percentage of growth from FDI, which is more a matter of where each region started 
from than where it ended, as NH grew by 3.60% between 1977 and 2011 while the US only grew 
by 2.26% during that timeframe. As the US numbers mark the average of all fifty states 
employment numbers, we can safely conclude from this analysis that NH relies far more heavily 
on FDI than a significant majority of the country. The data also seems to show that NH benefits 
from this reliance, given the higher average pay and benefits provided by FDI. We must also 
consider that higher FDI employment may provide a lower unemployment percentage. Rather 
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than simply replacing domestic jobs, having higher FDI seems to create new ones. Unfortunately 
the only evidence there is of this are the unemployment and FDI percentage of employment 
comparisons, for which there are multiple possible explanations, including pure coincidence. 
US	Compensation	Data	
 Again we will be comparing general US data to NH data, specifically US and NH 
compensation data, in order to get an idea of how NH does relative to the US in general. 
 The National average yearly growth for compensation was 0.44% lower than the growth 
for FDI. By comparison, NH average yearly growth for compensation was 0.28% higher than 
growth for FDI. It should be noted again that both NH and the US are using the same per capita 
FDI compensation data due to data access restrictions. Even still, this tells us that NH 
compensation has been growing faster than the national average by roughly 0.72% yearly. While 
NH started with a lower average compensation, it currently stands at 13.1% higher than the 
national average as of 2011. Because of this, NH compensation is slightly closer to the national 
average for FDI compensation, which in turn suggests that NH’s per capita FDI compensation 
should also be higher than the national average. 
 To figure out how much higher, we will take a look at the FDI compensation multiplier. 
This time around, rather than slowly sloping downward, we see that FDI per capita compensation 
grew relative to the national average compensation. Starting at a multiple of 1.38, it now stands 
at 1.63 times the average compensation, essentially a 25% difference from the perspective of 
average compensation. If NH FDI compensation followed this trend then FDI per capita 
compensation would equal $86,555.72 in 2011, which is a $9,932.42 difference from the national 
per capita FDI for that year. It is unlikely however that NH FDI would have followed this exact 
pattern, though it does bring doubt to the idea that the difference between per capita 
compensation and FDI per capita compensation in NH is shrinking. 




 Next we will examine this graph of the various FDI multipliers we have calculated. At 
first glance we see that NH wage and compensation trend closely with US compensation 
multiplier. In particular, both compensations remain very close through the 30 years which are 
examined in this graph (1977-2006). The only difference seems to be that US compensation 
slopes slightly upward, while NH Compensation has a slightly greater slope and slopes 
downward. All three slopes seem to cross each other between 1988 and 1990, while the benefits 
multiplier crosses the other three between 1983 and 1985, having started from a significantly 
lower point but grown at a substantially greater rate than any of the others. 
 During the late4 70’s we see the three closely tied multipliers all suffer a mild decrease, 
followed by an increase in the early 80’s. Afterward, all three decline at slightly different rates 
until 1989. After this point they all increase until 1993. It is at this point that, US Compensation 
differentiates itself, holding roughly steady, with a minor decrease in the late 90’s followed by an 
increase up until the last year on the chart. In comparison, both NH compensation and wage 
multipliers trend downward after 1993, only seeing slight bumps upward around 2000. The FDI 
benefits multiplier grew remarkably during this time, although after 1984 it tended to zigzag up 


























































 Here we see a graphical representation of the relative percentage of employment which is 
made up of people working for foreign owned companies in each of the regions. All show a clear 
trend upward, with a high point in the year 2000, followed by a slight decline which none of the 
regions have recovered from. The only exception to this trend is that Maine’s high point was in 
1998 rather than in 2000. Since all four regions see this pattern, we can assume that the change 
that occurred after the year 2000 had to be a national or international shift. While it is possible 
that the recession of 2001 played a part in the reduction of FDI employment, this seems unlikely 
as FDI jobs tend to be slightly more recession resistant than jobs in general. Another possible 
explanation involves the differences in presidential administrations between Clinton and Bush Jr. 
Bush tended to be of a less international mindset than Clinton did, but this would not necessarily 
impact FDI employment to such an extent going forward. One final possibility that we will look 
at is the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. This was a devastating event in which the US 
responded with a wave of patriotism, as well as multiple new laws and regulations to protect the 
United States from outside threats. It is possible that the attacks persuaded a portion of the 
people working for foreign companies to switch to working for domestic ones. It is also possible 
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inadvertently increased the difficulty of setting up and running a company if the owners were 
from a foreign country. The biggest problem with this theory is that it would require that the 
significant drop in FDI employment between 2000 and 2001 occur mainly within the last four 
months of 2001.  
All of this is conjecture however. There is any number of other possibilities for 
explaining the sudden shift in the growth trend, from a change in consumer preferences, to 
opening up of trade in China. Still it is worth considering, especially if there is in fact post 9/11 
legislation which is causing undue hardship toward any company which wishes to invest within 
the US. 
Changing focus, we will now look at specific unusual points within the data, beginning 
with the starting point of FDI within the state of NH. The other three data points are clustered 
around 1.11%, while NH FDI is a full percentage point higher. This means that at the very 
beginning of our data set, FDI was playing a far more important role in NH than it was in NH’s 
neighbors or in the US as a whole. The only time this does not hold true is between 1981 and 
1986, when ME had more FDI jobs relative to total employment. Other than this, NH tends to 
keep ahead of the other three regions, which each cross the others’ paths at least three times. It is 
unfortunate that data is not available before 1977 so we can see when it was that NH first began 
to differentiate itself regarding FDI. 
The other significantly unusual points seem to occur in ME, specifically the unusual 
spike which allowed it to temporarily surpass NH in FDI employment proportion, and the bizarre 
dip in the mid 2000’s which temporarily dropped ME below the national average. Since these 
two events do not match up with the lines from the other three regions, we must assume that they 
are caused by events which occurred only in ME, which helps to show that individual states can 
have significant impact on the FDI investment within their borders. No matter how similar all 
three states are to the average growth line that is the US line, something within each state can 
cause significant growth or contraction in FDI investment. 
One final note about the US line is that since it is an aggregate of all 50 states, it includes 
states which for one reason or another are not popular choices for FDI investment. For example, 
landlocked states will tend to be less popular for any foreign company who wishes to take 
advantage of a skilled US workforce but still wishes to sell the products manufactured outside of 
the US. This is because it becomes more expensive to ship their products if they are further from 
international shipping lanes and are forced to send them over land by train or truck to trade ports. 
This one fact helps explain why all three states examined are above the national average the 
majority of the time. All three are costal states with easy access to international shipping. While 
the nature of the difference is undoubtedly more complicated than this, access to shipping does 
play an important part. 
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Conclusion	
 Throughout the research we have seen several important trends. Foreign employment 
tends to pay better wages than domestic employers do, as well as offering significantly better 
benefits. This greater compensation creates a more significant effect on the economy and the 
GDP than mere employee counts would suggest. This in turn means that foreign companies that 
invest within NH are more valuable to the economy than a domestic company of the same size. It 
also helps to raise the median wage in NH and provide for a general sense of prosperity within 
the state. 
 We also saw a possible trend in which the percentage of employment that foreign entities 
are responsible for may create a long term impact on unemployment rates within the region. 
While evidence for this particular theory is thin, should it prove to be true it would be one of the 
most valuable arguments in favor of foreign direct investment. It suggests that foreign employers 
do not solely compete with domestic employers for people who are already working, but also 
hire from a pool of people who would otherwise be unemployed had the FDI not occurred. 
 Finally we draw our focus to the fact that NH relies far more on FDI than the United 
States in general, as well as both ME and MA. FDI has provided enormous benefits to NH, 
giving more than 10% of employment growth despite making up less than 6% of the workforce. 
Through higher average wage and benefits it has helped to increase the general wealth and 
wellbeing to its employees to a degree beyond the average job available in NH, despite NH 
compensation being higher than the national average since 1995. And while foreign investment 
has its hazards should they purchase a domestic company and then choose to lay off current 
employees, this is a risk which can occur whether the purchasing company is US or foreign 
based. FDI has provided many high quality jobs to the state of NH and helped reduce 
unemployment, both during recession and during prosperity. FDI has also helped to grow our 
GDP, both by providing employees with higher salaries and by creating products which are then 
sold outside the state, thereby bringing money into the economy that otherwise would not be 
there. 
 Therefore we must conclude that FDI is beneficial to NH as a whole. The benefits to the 
individual, to unemployment, and to the GDP are all there to be seen. While FDI growth has 
slipped since the new millennium, it remains a powerful force within the economy and should 
not be disregarded or rejected. If utilized properly, the benefits from further FDI development are 
powerful. They can bring stability during periods of economic uncertainty, and can provide 
opportunities for growth which might otherwise not exist within the state. This applies not only 
to NH itself but also to the rest of the country and most likely to any country on Earth. 
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Recommendations	
 My first and most important recommendation is for policy makers at the municipal, state, 
and federal levels. I recommend that steps be taken to ensure that foreign companies are just as 
free to develop their businesses on US soil as any domestic company would be. While there are 
obviously national security concerns that people will want addressed, the benefits that this 
investment would bring to potential employees and to the economy itself should come first. 
Growth in FDI since 2000 has been atrocious, so we must decide to let opportunity outweigh fear 
in our legislation. Choosing not to is negatively impacting the economy. 
 My next recommendation is for other researchers to continue where my work leaves off. I 
have uncovered interesting trends and patterns which need to be looked at further. In particular, 
the possibility that an increase in FDI as a portion of total employment leads to a nearly 1 to 1 
reduction in the unemployment rate is something that should be looked at further. Whether or not 
the research pans out, or even if the conclusion ends up stating that the only pattern is that states 
with more FDI tend to have lower unemployment rates, the question is an important one to both 
economists and policy makers. 
 My final recommendation is to companies who are investing or plan to invest in facilities 
in other countries. I recommend that you use the data contained within this research to encourage 
governments to let you develop further. I feel that your utility in whatever country you operate in 
is greater than the utility which the average domestic company can provide and you should be 
given every opportunity that they are given.  
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1973 4,173.00$                                 15.1% 1,818.95$                  4,863.00$                     ‐$                                ‐$                                0.00% 0.00
1974 4,470.00$                                 7.1% 2,003.31$                  10.1% 5,262.00$                     8.2% ‐$                                ‐$                                0.00% 0.00
1975 4,842.00$                                 8.3% 2,075.18$                  3.6% 5,602.00$                     6.5% ‐$                                ‐$                                0.00% 0.00
1976 5,511.00$                                 13.8% 2,317.36$                  11.7% 6,249.00$                     11.5% ‐$                                ‐$                                0.00% 0.00
1977 6,298.00$                                 14.3% 2,716.29$                  17.2% 6,866.00$                     9.9% 108.71$                         13,001.44$                   4.00% 1.89
1978 7,389.00$                                 17.3% 3,248.79$                  19.6% 7,730.00$                     12.6% 137.24$                         26.3% 14,115.26$                   8.6% 4.22% 1.83
1979 8,351.00$                                 13.0% 3,814.40$                  17.4% 8,686.00$                     12.4% 163.74$                         19.3% 15,103.34$                   7.0% 4.29% 1.74
1980 9,263.00$                                 10.9% 4,367.69$                  14.5% 9,816.00$                     13.0% 200.75$                         22.6% 16,283.73$                   7.8% 4.60% 1.66
1981 10,480.00$                               13.1% 4,983.24$                  14.1% 10,985.00$                   11.9% 259.16$                         29.1% 18,606.99$                   14.3% 5.20% 1.69
1982 11,407.00$                               8.8% 5,460.73$                  9.6% 11,979.00$                   9.0% 284.38$                         9.7% 20,481.10$                   10.1% 5.21% 1.71
1983 12,629.00$                               10.7% 6,131.07$                  12.3% 13,015.00$                   8.6% 322.33$                         13.3% 21,322.48$                   4.1% 5.26% 1.64
1984 14,767.00$                               16.9% 7,259.27$                  18.4% 14,455.00$                   11.1% 325.66$                         1.0% 21,897.77$                   2.7% 4.49% 1.51
1985 16,578.00$                               12.3% 8,212.50$                  13.1% 15,663.00$                   8.4% 378.36$                         16.2% 22,950.56$                   4.8% 4.61% 1.47
1986 18,369.00$                               10.8% 9,215.43$                  12.2% 16,819.00$                   7.4% 415.26$                         9.8% 24,345.70$                   6.1% 4.51% 1.45
1987 20,994.00$                               14.3% 10,301.08$                11.8% 18,088.00$                   7.5% 468.51$                         12.8% 24,788.64$                   1.8% 4.55% 1.37
1988 22,937.00$                               9.3% 11,284.69$                9.5% 19,361.00$                   7.0% 578.13$                         23.4% 25,809.53$                   4.1% 5.12% 1.33
1989 23,777.00$                               3.7% 11,889.52$                5.4% 20,235.00$                   4.5% 660.16$                         14.2% 26,301.23$                   1.9% 5.55% 1.30
1990 23,768.00$                               0.0% 11,838.71$                ‐0.4% 20,236.00$                   0.0% 729.12$                         10.4% 28,151.44$                   7.0% 6.16% 1.39
1991 24,763.00$                               4.2% 11,993.94$                1.3% 21,056.00$                   4.1% 832.20$                         14.1% 29,302.94$                   4.1% 6.94% 1.39
1992 26,332.00$                               6.3% 12,436.92$                3.7% 21,861.00$                   3.8% 868.38$                         4.3% 31,124.83$                   6.2% 6.98% 1.42
1993 27,362.00$                               3.9% 12,943.44$                4.1% 22,311.00$                   2.1% 992.16$                         14.3% 32,317.86$                   3.8% 7.67% 1.45
1994 29,190.00$                               6.7% 14,065.45$                8.7% 23,642.00$                   6.0% 950.55$                         ‐4.2% 33,120.34$                   2.5% 6.76% 1.40
1995 31,876.00$                               9.2% 15,054.31$                7.0% 24,845.00$                   5.1% 1,001.42$                     5.4% 33,380.75$                   0.8% 6.65% 1.34
1996 34,561.00$                               8.4% 16,459.20$                9.3% 26,649.00$                   7.3% 1,071.70$                     7.0% 34,795.30$                   4.2% 6.51% 1.31
1997 36,935.00$                               6.9% 17,504.63$                6.4% 27,546.00$                   3.4% 1,150.31$                     7.3% 36,402.08$                   4.6% 6.57% 1.32
1998 38,691.00$                               4.8% 19,319.93$                10.4% 29,664.00$                   7.7% 1,326.60$                     15.3% 37,264.13$                   2.4% 6.87% 1.26
1999 40,548.00$                               4.8% 20,672.02$                7.0% 31,036.00$                   4.6% 1,420.09$                     7.0% 39,556.87$                   6.2% 6.87% 1.27
2000 44,161.00$                               8.9% 23,027.17$                11.4% 34,087.00$                   9.8% 1,938.09$                     36.5% 41,679.34$                   5.4% 8.42% 1.22
2001 44,682.00$                               1.2% 23,920.01$                3.9% 35,140.00$                   3.1% 1,900.90$                     ‐1.9% 44,727.12$                   7.3% 7.95% 1.27
2002 46,730.00$                               4.6% 24,081.87$                0.7% 35,424.00$                   0.8% 1,800.13$                     ‐5.3% 43,272.35$                   ‐3.3% 7.48% 1.22
2003 48,768.00$                               4.4% 24,541.33$                1.9% 36,121.00$                   2.0% 1,859.07$                     3.3% 44,263.64$                   2.3% 7.58% 1.23
2004 51,335.00$                               5.3% 26,292.57$                7.1% 38,224.00$                   5.8% 1,964.31$                     5.7% 46,110.63$                   4.2% 7.47% 1.21
2005 53,693.00$                               4.6% 27,370.32$                4.1% 39,282.00$                   2.8% 2,006.61$                     2.2% 47,890.39$                   3.9% 7.33% 1.22
2006 56,103.00$                               4.5% 29,528.57$                7.9% 41,663.00$                   6.1% 2,079.23$                     3.6% 50,466.82$                   5.4% 7.04% 1.21
2007 57,868.00$                               3.1% 30,969.57$                4.9% 43,388.00$                   4.1% ‐$                                ‐$                                0.00% 0.00
2008 58,473.00$                               1.0% 31,696.42$                2.3% 44,380.00$                   2.3% ‐$                                ‐$                                0.00% 0.00
2009 58,951.00$                               0.8% 30,482.80$                ‐3.8% 43,788.00$                   ‐1.3% ‐$                                ‐$                                0.00% 0.00
2010 61,147.00$                               3.7% 31,182.26$                2.3% 44,952.00$                   2.7% ‐$                                ‐$                                0.00% 0.00
2011 63,333.00$                               3.6% 33,154.98$                6.3% 47,542.00$                   5.8% ‐$                                ‐$                                0.00% 0.00
2012 64,697.00$                               2.2% 34,454.90$                3.9% 49,129.00$                   3.3% ‐$                                ‐$                                0.00% 0.00
Net Change 60,524.00$                               26,812.28$                34,797.00$                   1,970.53$                     37,465.38$                  





































1973 2,579.60$                               6,896.63$                               ‐$                                          ‐$                          0.00% 0.00 2,033.63$             ‐$                                0
1974 2,806.20$                               8.8% 7,370.93$                               6.9% ‐$                                          ‐$                          0.00% 0.00 2,108.93$             3.7% ‐$                                0
1975 2,933.80$                               4.5% 7,919.86$                               7.4% ‐$                                          ‐$                          0.00% 0.00 2,317.86$             9.9% ‐$                                0
1976 3,370.50$                               14.9% 9,088.90$                               14.8% ‐$                                          ‐$                          0.00% 0.00 2,839.90$             22.5% ‐$                                0
1977 3,841.30$                               14.0% 9,709.72$                               6.8% 128.85$                                    15,410.54$             3.35% 1.59 2,843.72$             0.1% 2,409.10$                     0.85
1978 4,495.30$                               17.0% 10,695.89$                             10.2% 164.73$                                    27.8% 16,942.09$             9.9% 3.66% 1.58 2,965.89$             4.3% 2,826.83$                     17.3% 0.95
1979 5,149.80$                               14.6% 11,726.93$                             9.6% 195.93$                                    18.9% 18,073.36$             6.7% 3.80% 1.54 3,040.93$             2.5% 2,970.02$                     5.1% 0.98
1980 5,747.00$                               11.6% 12,915.88$                             10.1% 242.73$                                    23.9% 19,689.45$             8.9% 4.22% 1.52 3,099.88$             1.9% 3,405.72$                     14.7% 1.10
1981 6,392.20$                               11.2% 14,090.91$                             9.1% 315.83$                                    30.1% 22,675.99$             15.2% 4.94% 1.61 3,105.91$             0.2% 4,069.00$                     19.5% 1.31
1982 6,964.60$                               9.0% 15,277.97$                             8.4% 348.74$                                    10.4% 25,116.60$             10.8% 5.01% 1.64 3,298.97$             6.2% 4,635.50$                     13.9% 1.41
1983 7,721.80$                               10.9% 16,391.80$                             7.3% 396.59$                                    13.7% 26,234.69$             4.5% 5.14% 1.60 3,376.80$             2.4% 4,912.21$                     6.0% 1.45
1984 8,644.60$                               12.0% 17,213.53$                             5.0% 400.83$                                    1.1% 26,951.75$             2.7% 4.64% 1.57 2,758.53$             ‐18.3% 5,053.98$                     2.9% 1.83
1985 9,679.90$                               12.0% 18,461.64$                             7.3% 460.41$                                    14.9% 27,927.58$             3.6% 4.76% 1.51 2,798.64$             1.5% 4,977.02$                     ‐1.5% 1.78
1986 10,849.10$                             12.1% 19,800.59$                             7.3% 502.16$                                    9.1% 29,440.18$             5.4% 4.63% 1.49 2,981.59$             6.5% 5,094.47$                     2.4% 1.71
1987 12,085.40$                             11.4% 21,221.15$                             7.2% 562.78$                                    12.1% 29,776.70$             1.1% 4.66% 1.40 3,133.15$             5.1% 4,988.06$                     ‐2.1% 1.59
1988 13,326.10$                             10.3% 22,863.41$                             7.7% 696.83$                                    23.8% 31,108.68$             4.5% 5.23% 1.36 3,502.41$             11.8% 5,299.15$                     6.2% 1.51
1989 13,870.40$                             4.1% 23,606.30$                             3.2% 802.03$                                    15.1% 31,953.45$             2.7% 5.78% 1.35 3,371.30$             ‐3.7% 5,652.22$                     6.7% 1.68
1990 13,955.80$                             0.6% 23,854.76$                             1.1% 894.93$                                    11.6% 34,553.17$             8.1% 6.41% 1.45 3,618.76$             7.3% 6,401.73$                     13.3% 1.77
1991 13,842.00$                             ‐0.8% 24,300.37$                             1.9% 1,025.78$                                14.6% 36,119.17$             4.5% 7.41% 1.49 3,244.37$             ‐10.3% 6,816.23$                     6.5% 2.10
1992 14,739.80$                             6.5% 25,908.89$                             6.6% 1,077.32$                                5.0% 38,613.69$             6.9% 7.31% 1.49 4,047.89$             24.8% 7,488.87$                     9.9% 1.85
1993 15,287.60$                             3.7% 26,351.71$                             1.7% 1,243.31$                                15.4% 40,498.57$             4.9% 8.13% 1.54 4,040.71$             ‐0.2% 8,180.71$                     9.2% 2.02
1994 16,270.00$                             6.4% 27,347.53$                             3.8% 1,189.47$                                ‐4.3% 41,445.10$             2.3% 7.31% 1.52 3,705.53$             ‐8.3% 8,324.76$                     1.8% 2.25
1995 17,440.80$                             7.2% 28,783.57$                             5.3% 1,252.71$                                5.3% 41,756.85$             0.8% 7.18% 1.45 3,938.57$             6.3% 8,376.10$                     0.6% 2.13
1996 18,470.50$                             5.9% 29,905.49$                             3.9% 1,331.17$                                6.3% 43,219.78$             3.5% 7.21% 1.45 3,256.49$             ‐17.3% 8,424.49$                     0.6% 2.59
1997 19,960.70$                             8.1% 31,410.97$                             5.0% 1,418.33$                                6.5% 44,883.98$             3.9% 7.11% 1.43 3,864.97$             18.7% 8,481.90$                     0.7% 2.19
1998 21,749.20$                             9.0% 33,393.93$                             6.3% 1,652.68$                                16.5% 46,423.55$             3.4% 7.60% 1.39 3,729.93$             ‐3.5% 9,159.42$                     8.0% 2.46
1999 23,204.20$                             6.7% 34,837.69$                             4.3% 1,743.46$                                5.5% 48,564.44$             4.6% 7.51% 1.39 3,801.69$             1.9% 9,007.57$                     ‐1.7% 2.37
2000 25,729.90$                             10.9% 38,087.84$                             9.3% 2,367.29$                                35.8% 50,909.48$             4.8% 9.20% 1.34 4,000.84$             5.2% 9,230.14$                     2.5% 2.31
2001 27,013.10$                             5.0% 39,683.95$                             4.2% 2,337.32$                                ‐1.3% 54,995.77$             8.0% 8.65% 1.39 4,543.95$             13.6% 10,268.65$                   11.3% 2.26
2002 27,483.80$                             1.7% 40,428.17$                             1.9% 1,743.00$                                ‐25.4% 57,709.57$             4.9% 6.34% 1.43 5,004.17$             10.1% 14,437.22$                   40.6% 2.89
2003 28,634.90$                             4.2% 42,146.10$                             4.2% 2,519.40$                                44.5% 59,985.82$             3.9% 8.80% 1.42 6,025.10$             20.4% 15,722.19$                   8.9% 2.61
2004 30,496.60$                             6.5% 44,335.80$                             5.2% 2,668.84$                                5.9% 62,648.88$             4.4% 8.75% 1.41 6,111.80$             1.4% 16,538.25$                   5.2% 2.71
2005 31,932.10$                             4.7% 45,829.08$                             3.4% 2,703.09$                                1.3% 64,512.93$             3.0% 8.47% 1.41 6,547.08$             7.1% 16,622.54$                   0.5% 2.54
2006 33,655.80$                             5.4% 47,486.27$                             3.6% 2,810.59$                                4.0% 68,218.19$             5.7% 8.35% 1.44 5,823.27$             ‐11.1% 17,751.37$                   6.8% 3.05
2007 34,963.40$                             3.9% 48,983.30$                             3.2% 2,910.54$                                3.6% 71,865.26$             5.3% 8.32% 1.47 5,595.30$             ‐3.9% ‐$                                0
2008 35,826.80$                             2.5% 50,163.19$                             2.4% 3,035.79$                                4.3% 72,280.74$             0.6% 8.47% 1.44 5,783.19$             3.4% ‐$                                0
2009 35,104.40$                             ‐2.0% 50,426.85$                             0.5% 3,059.75$                                0.8% 75,363.35$             4.3% 8.72% 1.49 6,638.85$             14.8% ‐$                                0
2010 36,043.90$                             2.7% 51,960.49$                             3.0% 2,997.39$                                ‐2.0% 75,122.65$             ‐0.3% 8.32% 1.45 7,008.49$             5.6% ‐$                                0
2011 37,032.20$                             2.7% 53,101.67$                             2.2% 3,049.61$                                1.7% 76,623.30$             2.0% 8.24% 1.44 5,559.67$             ‐20.7% ‐$                                0
2012 37,737.80$                             1.9% 53,810.06$                             1.3% ‐$                                          ‐$                          0.00% 0.00 4,681.06$             ‐15.8% ‐$                                0
Net Change 33,190.90$                             43,391.95$                             2,920.76$                                61,212.76$             2,979.55$             15,342.27$                  
Average 7.0% 4.88% 10.5% 4.60% 3.0% 7.4%
























1976 370837 93.30% 0.11% 0.00%
1977 395614 94.40% 6.68% 8361 2.11% #DIV/0! 2.00% #DIV/0!
1978 420283 96.20% 6.24% 9723 2.31% 16.29% 9.26% 2.23% 11.55% 5.5%
1979 439143 96.80% 4.49% 10841 2.47% 11.50% 13.83% 2.39% 7.38% 5.9%
1980 444956 95.40% 1.32% 12328 2.77% 13.72% 12.73% 2.64% 10.61% 25.6%
1981 453640 94.80% 1.95% 13928 3.07% 12.98% 8.80% 2.91% 10.12% 18.4%
1982 455859 93.00% 0.49% 13885 3.05% ‐0.31% 7.18% 2.83% ‐2.68% ‐1.9%
1983 471077 94.40% 3.34% 15117 3.21% 8.87% 2.31% 3.03% 6.94% 8.1%
1984 502198 95.70% 6.61% 14872 2.96% ‐1.62% 6.03% 2.83% ‐6.45% ‐0.8%
1985 524325 96.20% 4.41% 16486 3.14% 10.85% 4.23% 3.02% 6.73% 7.3%
1986 547918 97.50% 4.50% 17057 3.11% 3.46% 8.37% 3.04% 0.35% 2.4%
1987 569498 97.70% 3.94% 18900 3.32% 10.80% 10.93% 3.24% 6.82% 8.5%
1988 582857 97.50% 2.35% 22400 3.84% 18.52% 13.79% 3.75% 15.57% 26.2%
1989 587572 96.50% 0.81% 25100 4.27% 12.05% 11.25% 4.12% 10.01% 57.3%
1990 585032 94.40% ‐0.43% 25900 4.43% 3.19% 8.30% 4.18% 1.38% 31.5%
1991 569621 92.70% ‐2.63% 28400 4.99% 9.65% 3.69% 4.62% 10.59% 16.2%
1992 568909 92.40% ‐0.12% 27900 4.90% ‐1.76% 5.98% 4.53% ‐1.96% ‐70.2%
1993 580137 93.70% 1.97% 30700 5.29% 10.04% 0.59% 4.96% 9.42% 24.9%
1994 594935 95.30% 2.55% 28700 4.82% ‐6.51% 2.68% 4.60% ‐7.28% ‐13.5%
1995 605929 96.00% 1.85% 30000 4.95% 4.53% 0.23% 4.75% 3.39% 11.8%
1996 617629 96.30% 1.93% 30800 4.99% 2.67% 3.26% 4.80% 1.04% 6.8%
1997 635469 96.90% 2.89% 31600 4.97% 2.60% 5.97% 4.82% 0.34% 4.5%
1998 651292 97.10% 2.49% 35600 5.47% 12.66% 5.37% 5.31% 10.15% 25.3%
1999 666066 97.20% 2.27% 35900 5.39% 0.84% 14.34% 5.24% ‐1.29% 2.0%
2000 675541 97.30% 1.42% 46500 6.88% 29.53% 7.26% 6.70% 27.84% 111.9%
2001 680706 96.60% 0.76% 42500 6.24% ‐8.60% 6.27% 6.03% ‐9.95% ‐77.4%
2002 679818 95.50% ‐0.13% 41600 6.12% ‐2.12% ‐3.25% 5.84% ‐3.11% ‐101.4%
2003 679420 95.50% ‐0.06% 42000 6.18% 0.96% 0.09% 5.90% 1.02% 100.5%
2004 687855 96.10% 1.24% 42600 6.19% 1.43% 0.25% 5.95% 0.81% 7.1%
2005 696765 96.40% 1.30% 41900 6.01% ‐1.64% ‐0.63% 5.80% ‐2.60% ‐7.9%
2006 708748 96.50% 1.72% 41200 5.81% ‐1.67% ‐1.67% 5.61% ‐3.23% ‐5.8%
2007 713782 96.50% 0.71% 40500 5.67% ‐1.70% 0.11% 5.48% ‐2.39% ‐13.9%
2008 714205 96.10% 0.06% 42000 5.88% 3.70% ‐0.44% 5.65% 3.21% 354.6%
2009 696145 93.80% ‐2.53% 40600 5.83% ‐3.33% ‐0.45% 5.47% ‐3.20% ‐7.8%
2010 693679 93.90% ‐0.35% 39900 5.75% ‐1.72% ‐1.77% 5.40% ‐1.27% ‐28.4%
2011 697383 94.50% 0.53% 39800 5.71% ‐0.25% ‐0.66% 5.39% ‐0.15% ‐2.7%
2012 701315 94.50% 0.56% 39800 5.68% 0.00% 5.36% ‐0.56% 0.0%
Net Change 301769 31439
Average 95.63% 1.60% 4.71% 4.34% 4.50% 3.23% 10.4%
Standard 
deviation 96924 1.4% 2.22% 11900 1.37% 8.09% 5.11% 1.31% 7.56% 71.9%



























1976 2755729 90.2% 0.00% 0.00%
1977 2833405 91.1% 2.82% 30326 1.07% #DIV/0! 0.98% #DIV/0!
1978 2957517 93.8% 4.38% 30691 1.04% 1.20% #DIV/0! 0.97% ‐0.17% 0.3%
1979 3073593 94.5% 3.92% 39541 1.29% 28.84% 17.06% 1.22% 24.90% 7.6%
1980 3133686 94.3% 1.96% 47901 1.53% 21.14% 22.05% 1.44% 18.57% 13.9%
1981 3141874 93.6% 0.26% 55643 1.77% 16.16% 15.60% 1.66% 15.00% 94.6%
1982 3143386 92.0% 0.05% 60919 1.94% 9.48% 11.74% 1.78% 7.56% 348.9%
1983 3215449 93.0% 2.29% 66756 2.08% 9.58% 7.07% 1.93% 8.29% 8.1%
1984 3402387 95.2% 5.81% 68189 2.00% 2.15% 5.55% 1.91% ‐1.18% 0.8%
1985 3509658 95.9% 3.15% 71545 2.04% 4.92% 3.67% 1.95% 2.46% 3.1%
1986 3604577 96.0% 2.70% 74356 2.06% 3.93% 11.08% 1.98% 1.30% 3.0%
1987 3632415 96.6% 0.77% 92500 2.55% 24.40% 15.86% 2.46% 24.22% 65.2%
1988 3739313 96.7% 2.94% 110300 2.95% 19.24% 20.23% 2.85% 15.95% 16.7%
1989 3710110 95.8% ‐0.78% 129100 3.48% 17.04% 12.64% 3.33% 16.87% 64.4%
1990 3614703 93.7% ‐2.57% 131200 3.63% 1.63% 5.56% 3.40% 2.02% 2.2%
1991 3450717 91.2% ‐4.54% 128600 3.73% ‐1.98% ‐3.82% 3.40% ‐0.06% ‐1.6%
1992 3481815 91.2% 0.90% 114300 3.28% ‐11.12% ‐2.82% 2.99% ‐11.91% ‐46.0%
1993 3547680 92.7% 1.89% 119600 3.37% 4.64% 0.68% 3.13% 4.38% 8.0%
1994 3615952 93.8% 1.92% 129800 3.59% 8.53% 7.39% 3.37% 7.74% 14.9%
1995 3648939 94.5% 0.91% 141500 3.88% 9.01% 10.75% 3.66% 8.83% 35.5%
1996 3712827 95.4% 1.75% 162300 4.37% 14.70% 8.17% 4.17% 13.80% 32.6%
1997 3802454 95.9% 2.41% 163600 4.30% 0.80% 8.02% 4.13% ‐1.06% 1.5%
1998 3884883 96.6% 2.17% 177600 4.57% 8.56% 6.31% 4.42% 7.03% 17.0%
1999 3948929 96.7% 1.65% 194600 4.93% 9.57% 11.56% 4.77% 7.91% 26.5%
2000 4057959 97.3% 2.76% 226800 5.59% 16.55% 7.96% 5.44% 14.12% 29.5%
2001 4087239 96.3% 0.72% 221700 5.42% ‐2.25% 1.70% 5.22% ‐3.95% ‐17.4%
2002 4031355 94.7% ‐1.37% 201300 4.99% ‐9.20% ‐5.29% 4.73% ‐9.47% ‐36.5%
2003 4000724 94.2% ‐0.76% 192400 4.81% ‐4.42% ‐5.39% 4.53% ‐4.20% ‐29.1%
2004 4023283 94.8% 0.56% 187500 4.66% ‐2.55% ‐5.11% 4.42% ‐2.48% ‐21.7%
2005 4063515 95.2% 1.00% 171800 4.23% ‐8.37% ‐1.95% 4.02% ‐8.90% ‐39.0%
2006 4111675 95.2% 1.19% 180500 4.39% 5.06% 1.00% 4.18% 3.83% 18.1%
2007 4201391 95.5% 2.18% 191900 4.57% 6.32% 4.97% 4.36% 4.37% 12.7%
2008 4217199 94.7% 0.38% 198700 4.71% 3.54% 2.13% 4.46% 2.29% 43.0%
2009 4123064 91.8% ‐2.23% 191800 4.65% ‐3.47% 0.86% 4.27% ‐4.29% ‐7.3%
2010 4112882 91.7% ‐0.25% 196600 4.78% 2.50% ‐0.04% 4.38% 2.64% 47.1%
2011 4177918 92.7% 1.58% 198300 4.75% 0.86% 1.12% 4.40% 0.38% 2.6%
2012 4250566 93.2% 1.74% 198300 4.67% 0.00% 4.35% ‐1.18% 0.0%
Net Change 1220401 167609
Average 94.47% 1.02% 3.59% 5.64% 3.39% 4.91% 13.7%
Standard 
deviation 392682 1.8% 2.02% 60740 1.36% 9.55% 7.38% 1.30% 9.06% 65.2%



























1976 497868 91.5% 0.00% 0.00%
1977 512788 91.7% 3.00% 5713 1.11% #DIV/0! 1.02% #DIV/0!
1978 531154 93.6% 3.58% 7531 1.42% 31.82% #DIV/0! 1.33% 29.90% 9.9%
1979 544802 93.4% 2.57% 9904 1.82% 31.51% 36.48% 1.70% 27.94% 17.4%
1980 552745 92.6% 1.46% 14471 2.62% 46.11% 33.28% 2.42% 42.78% 57.5%
1981 551487 92.9% ‐0.23% 17685 3.21% 22.21% 26.00% 2.98% 22.89% 255.5%
1982 553311 91.7% 0.33% 19398 3.51% 9.69% 14.54% 3.21% 7.91% 93.9%
1983 565243 92.0% 2.16% 21674 3.83% 11.73% 10.46% 3.53% 9.73% 19.1%
1984 587454 94.0% 3.93% 23835 4.06% 9.97% 3.45% 3.81% 8.11% 9.7%
1985 606390 94.5% 3.22% 21130 3.48% ‐11.35% ‐1.84% 3.29% ‐13.66% ‐14.3%
1986 630438 94.8% 3.97% 20258 3.21% ‐4.13% ‐4.60% 3.05% ‐7.49% ‐3.6%
1987 652556 95.3% 3.51% 20600 3.16% 1.69% 5.34% 3.01% ‐1.24% 1.5%
1988 686290 96.3% 5.17% 24400 3.56% 18.45% 10.40% 3.42% 13.81% 11.3%
1989 701652 96.0% 2.24% 27100 3.86% 11.07% 9.22% 3.71% 8.30% 17.6%
1990 701002 94.7% ‐0.09% 26600 3.79% ‐1.85% 3.07% 3.59% ‐3.08% ‐76.9%
1991 677564 92.4% ‐3.34% 26600 3.93% 0.00% ‐3.75% 3.63% 0.95% 0.0%
1992 680841 92.9% 0.48% 24100 3.54% ‐9.40% ‐2.99% 3.29% ‐9.35% ‐76.3%
1993 691753 93.4% 1.60% 24200 3.50% 0.41% ‐2.44% 3.27% ‐0.64% 0.9%
1994 702752 93.6% 1.59% 24600 3.50% 1.65% 6.79% 3.28% 0.28% 3.6%
1995 704574 94.2% 0.26% 29100 4.13% 18.29% 8.14% 3.89% 18.74% 247.0%
1996 714237 94.8% 1.37% 30400 4.26% 4.47% 9.34% 4.03% 3.71% 13.5%
1997 727238 94.9% 1.82% 32000 4.40% 5.26% 4.18% 4.18% 3.49% 12.3%
1998 747472 95.5% 2.78% 32900 4.40% 2.81% 2.59% 4.20% 0.66% 4.4%
1999 762877 96.1% 2.06% 32800 4.30% ‐0.30% 1.95% 4.13% ‐1.70% ‐0.6%
2000 785319 96.7% 2.94% 33900 4.32% 3.35% 1.21% 4.17% 1.03% 4.9%
2001 787567 96.3% 0.29% 34100 4.33% 0.59% 0.14% 4.17% ‐0.11% 8.9%
2002 789968 95.6% 0.30% 32900 4.16% ‐3.52% ‐3.71% 3.98% ‐4.51% ‐50.0%
2003 794226 95.0% 0.54% 30200 3.80% ‐8.21% ‐3.36% 3.61% ‐9.27% ‐63.4%
2004 807673 95.4% 1.69% 30700 3.80% 1.66% ‐8.81% 3.63% 0.38% 3.7%
2005 810303 95.1% 0.33% 24600 3.04% ‐19.87% ‐5.12% 2.89% ‐20.38% ‐231.9%
2006 817765 95.3% 0.92% 25300 3.09% 2.85% 2.23% 2.95% 2.12% 9.4%
2007 828755 95.3% 1.34% 31300 3.78% 23.72% 9.07% 3.60% 22.07% 54.6%
2008 824563 94.6% ‐0.51% 31500 3.82% 0.64% 7.59% 3.61% 0.41% 4.8%
2009 802310 91.9% ‐2.70% 31000 3.86% ‐1.59% 0.11% 3.55% ‐1.74% ‐2.2%
2010 791017 91.8% ‐1.41% 31400 3.97% 1.29% 0.11% 3.64% 2.62% 3.5%
2011 794311 92.3% 0.42% 31600 3.98% 0.64% 0.64% 3.67% 0.77% 6.1%
2012 801072 92.8% 0.85% 31600 3.94% 0.00% 3.66% ‐0.31% 0.0%
Net Change 281523 25887
Average 94.22% 1.26% 3.63% 4.48% 3.42% 4.57% 9.2%
Standard 
deviation 99558 1.5% 1.83% 7442 0.79% 13.39% 10.25% 0.76% 12.97% 80.1%
































1976 101591200 92.3% 0.00% 0.00%
1977 105042200 92.9% 3.40% 1218711 1.16% #DIV/0! 1.08% #DIV/0!
1978 109686600 93.9% 4.42% 1429871 1.30% 17.33% #DIV/0! 1.22% 13.57% 4.5%
1979 113147100 94.2% 3.15% 1753188 1.55% 22.61% 18.65% 1.46% 19.24% 9.3%
1980 113983200 92.9% 0.74% 2033932 1.78% 16.01% 19.15% 1.66% 13.57% 33.6%
1981 114914000 92.4% 0.82% 2416565 2.10% 18.81% 12.04% 1.94% 17.22% 41.1%
1982 114163300 90.3% ‐0.65% 2448062 2.14% 1.30% 8.05% 1.94% ‐0.35% 4.2%
1983 115645700 90.4% 1.30% 2546514 2.20% 4.02% 3.97% 1.99% 2.80% 6.6%
1984 120528100 92.5% 4.22% 2714295 2.25% 6.59% 5.35% 2.08% 4.65% 3.4%
1985 123796700 92.8% 2.71% 2862153 2.31% 5.45% 4.89% 2.15% 3.00% 4.5%
1986 126232300 93.0% 1.97% 2937890 2.33% 2.65% 5.95% 2.16% 0.88% 3.1%
1987 129548400 93.8% 2.63% 3224300 2.49% 9.75% 10.54% 2.33% 7.86% 8.6%
1988 133563900 94.5% 3.10% 3844200 2.88% 19.23% 15.44% 2.72% 16.50% 15.4%
1989 136177800 94.7% 1.96% 4511500 3.31% 17.36% 13.84% 3.14% 15.35% 25.5%
1990 138330900 94.4% 1.58% 4734500 3.42% 4.94% 8.40% 3.23% 2.98% 10.4%
1991 137612800 93.2% ‐0.52% 4871900 3.54% 2.90% 1.54% 3.30% 2.12% 19.1%
1992 138166100 92.5% 0.40% 4715400 3.41% ‐3.21% 0.25% 3.16% ‐4.32% ‐28.3%
1993 140774400 93.1% 1.89% 4765600 3.39% 1.06% ‐0.19% 3.15% ‐0.16% 1.9%
1994 144196600 93.9% 2.43% 4840500 3.36% 1.57% 1.58% 3.15% 0.01% 2.2%
1995 147915800 94.4% 2.58% 4941800 3.34% 2.09% 2.32% 3.15% 0.06% 2.7%
1996 151056200 94.6% 2.12% 5105000 3.38% 3.30% 2.43% 3.20% 1.37% 5.2%
1997 154541200 95.1% 2.31% 5201900 3.37% 1.90% 4.58% 3.20% 0.13% 2.8%
1998 158481200 95.5% 2.55% 5646100 3.56% 8.54% 5.73% 3.40% 6.29% 11.3%
1999 161531300 95.8% 1.92% 6027600 3.73% 6.76% 7.85% 3.57% 5.07% 12.5%
2000 165370800 96.0% 2.38% 6524600 3.95% 8.25% 3.69% 3.79% 5.95% 12.9%
2001 165519200 95.3% 0.09% 6268300 3.79% ‐3.93% ‐0.39% 3.61% ‐4.71% ‐172.7%
2002 165158100 94.2% ‐0.22% 5925100 3.59% ‐5.48% ‐4.33% 3.38% ‐6.36% ‐95.0%
2003 166026500 94.0% 0.53% 5713200 3.44% ‐3.58% ‐3.58% 3.23% ‐4.28% ‐24.4%
2004 169036700 94.5% 1.81% 5617100 3.32% ‐1.68% ‐1.47% 3.14% ‐2.92% ‐3.2%
2005 172556400 94.9% 2.08% 5665500 3.28% 0.86% 0.54% 3.12% ‐0.78% 1.4%
2006 176116600 95.4% 2.06% 5803100 3.30% 2.43% 2.74% 3.14% 0.89% 3.9%
2007 179874700 95.4% 2.13% 6088700 3.38% 4.92% 3.74% 3.23% 2.73% 7.6%
2008 179643900 94.2% ‐0.13% 6324700 3.52% 3.88% 1.11% 3.32% 2.70% 102.3%
2009 174225700 90.7% ‐3.02% 5979100 3.43% ‐5.46% ‐0.55% 3.11% ‐6.15% ‐6.4%
2010 173043700 90.4% ‐0.68% 5976200 3.45% ‐0.05% ‐0.87% 3.12% 0.30% ‐0.2%
2011 176341700 91.1% 1.91% 6149500 3.49% 2.90% 0.95% 3.18% 1.76% 5.3%
2012 179613300 92.6% 1.86% 6149500 3.42% 0.00% 3.17% ‐0.20% 0.0%
Net Chang 71299500 4930789
Average 93.62% 1.48% 3.03% 4.49% 2.84% 3.44% 6.9%
Standard 
deviation 23740357 1.6% 1.52% 1623756 0.76% 7.37% 5.93% 0.72% 6.79% 41.1%
































1973 815,000.00$                           98427500 8,280.21$               
1974 890,300.00$                           100111800 8,893.06$                7.40%
1975 950,200.00$                           98900600 9,607.63$                8.04%
1976 1,051,200.00$                       101591200 10,347.35$              7.70%
1977 1,169,000.00$                       105042200 18,781.00$                               15,845.00$                               1218.711 11,128.86$              7.55% 15,410.54$               1.38 13,001.44$     
1978 1,320,200.00$                       109686600 24,225.00$                               20,183.00$                               1429.871 12,036.11$              8.15% 16,942.09$               9.94% 1.41 14,115.26$     
1979 1,481,000.00$                       113147100 31,686.00$                               26,479.00$                               1753.188 13,089.16$              8.75% 18,073.36$               6.68% 1.38 15,103.34$     
1980 1,626,200.00$                       113983200 40,047.00$                               33,120.00$                               2033.932 14,267.01$              9.00% 19,689.45$               8.94% 1.38 16,283.73$     
1981 1,795,300.00$                       114914000 54,798.00$                               44,965.00$                               2416.565 15,622.99$              9.50% 22,675.99$               15.17% 1.45 18,606.99$     
1982 1,894,300.00$                       114163300 61,487.00$                               50,139.00$                               2448.062 16,592.90$              6.21% 25,116.60$               10.76% 1.51 20,481.10$     
1983 2,013,900.00$                       115645700 66,807.00$                               54,298.00$                               2546.514 17,414.40$              4.95% 26,234.69$               4.45% 1.51 21,322.48$     
1984 2,217,400.00$                       120528100 73,155.00$                               59,437.00$                               2714.295 18,397.37$              5.64% 26,951.75$               2.73% 1.46 21,897.77$     
1985 2,389,000.00$                       123796700 79,933.00$                               65,688.00$                               2862.153 19,297.77$              4.89% 27,927.58$               3.62% 1.45 22,950.56$     
1986 2,543,800.00$                       126232300 86,492.00$                               71,525.00$                               2937.89 20,151.74$              4.43% 29,440.18$               5.42% 1.46 24,345.70$     
1987 2,724,300.00$                       129548400 96,009.00$                               79,926.00$                               3224.3 21,029.21$              4.35% 29,776.70$               1.14% 1.42 24,788.64$     
1988 2,950,000.00$                       133563900 119,588.00$                            99,217.00$                               3844.2 22,086.81$              5.03% 31,108.68$               4.47% 1.41 25,809.53$     
1989 3,142,600.00$                       136177800 144,158.00$                            118,658.00$                            4511.5 23,077.18$              4.48% 31,953.45$               2.72% 1.38 26,301.23$     
1990 3,342,700.00$                       138330900 163,592.00$                            133,283.00$                            4734.5 24,164.52$              4.71% 34,553.17$               8.14% 1.43 28,151.44$     
1991 3,452,000.00$                       137612800 175,969.00$                            142,761.00$                            4871.9 25,084.88$              3.81% 36,119.17$               4.53% 1.44 29,302.94$     
1992 3,671,100.00$                       138166100 182,079.00$                            146,766.00$                            4715.4 26,570.19$              5.92% 38,613.69$               6.91% 1.45 31,124.83$     
1993 3,820,700.00$                       140774400 193,000.00$                            154,014.00$                            4765.6 27,140.59$              2.15% 40,498.57$               4.88% 1.49 32,317.86$     
1994 4,010,100.00$                       144196600 200,615.00$                            160,319.00$                            4840.5 27,809.95$              2.47% 41,445.10$               2.34% 1.49 33,120.34$     
1995 4,202,600.00$                       147915800 206,354.00$                            164,961.00$                            4941.8 28,412.11$              2.17% 41,756.85$               0.75% 1.47 33,380.75$     
1996 4,422,100.00$                       151056200 220,637.00$                            177,630.00$                            5105 29,274.53$              3.04% 43,219.78$               3.50% 1.48 34,795.30$     
1997 4,714,700.00$                       154541200 233,482.00$                            189,360.00$                            5201.9 30,507.72$              4.21% 44,883.98$               3.85% 1.47 36,402.08$     
1998 5,077,800.00$                       158481200 262,112.00$                            210,397.00$                            5646.1 32,040.39$              5.02% 46,423.55$               3.43% 1.45 37,264.13$     
1999 5,410,300.00$                       161531300 292,727.00$                            238,433.00$                            6027.6 33,493.82$              4.54% 48,564.44$               4.61% 1.45 39,556.87$     
2000 5,856,600.00$                       165370800 332,164.00$                            271,941.00$                            6524.6 35,414.96$              5.74% 50,909.48$               4.83% 1.44 41,679.34$     
2001 6,046,500.00$                       165519200 344,730.00$                            280,363.00$                            6268.3 36,530.51$              3.15% 54,995.77$               8.03% 1.51 44,727.12$     
2002 6,141,900.00$                       165158100 341,935.00$                            256,393.00$                            5925.1 37,188.00$              1.80% 57,709.57$               4.93% 1.55 43,272.35$     
2003 6,365,400.00$                       166026500 342,711.00$                            252,887.00$                            5713.2 38,339.66$              3.10% 59,985.82$               3.94% 1.56 44,263.64$     
2004 6,740,500.00$                       169036700 351,905.00$                            259,008.00$                            5617.1 39,875.96$              4.01% 62,648.88$               4.44% 1.57 46,110.63$     
2005 7,087,800.00$                       172556400 365,498.00$                            271,323.00$                            5665.5 41,075.27$              3.01% 64,512.93$               2.98% 1.57 47,890.39$     
2006 7,503,200.00$                       176116600 395,877.00$                            292,864.00$                            5803.1 42,603.59$              3.72% 68,218.19$               5.74% 1.60 50,466.82$     
2007 7,899,100.00$                       179874700 437,566.00$                            6088.7 43,914.46$              3.08% 71,865.26$               5.35% 1.64 ‐$                 
2008 8,079,200.00$                       179643900 457,154.00$                            6324.7 44,973.42$              2.41% 72,280.74$               0.58% 1.61 ‐$                 
2009 7,787,800.00$                       174225700 450,605.00$                            5979.1 44,699.49$              ‐0.61% 75,363.35$               4.26% 1.69 ‐$                 
2010 7,967,300.00$                       173043700 448,948.00$                            5976.2 46,042.13$              3.00% 75,122.65$               ‐0.32% 1.63 ‐$                 
2011 8,278,500.00$                       176341700 471,195.00$                            6149.5 46,945.79$              1.96% 76,623.30$               2.00% 1.63 ‐$                 
2012 179613300 ‐$                          
Net Change 7,109,500.00$                       71299500 452,414.00$                            4930.789 35,816.93$              61,212.76$              
Average 4.14% 4.60% 1.49
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